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I INTRODUCTION 
This paper discusses the conllict between the copyright owner's interest 
in controlling the use of his or her work and the parodist's interest in 
taking from the copyright work to create a new independent work. 
There is also the importance of advancing the public interest in the 
production of creative works. 
Firstly, I will discuss for background, the general law of copyright 
infringement and the fair dealing defence. Parodies can either be subject 
to an infringement action or be protected from a successful action by the 
copyright owner because of this fair dealing defence. 
The problem of the definition of parody is examined and it is suggested 
the more acceptable legal definition is one which requires critical 
comment to be made by the parodist. This definition would justify the 
protection of parody under fair dealing. 
New Zealand has no case law on the treatment of parody. Other 
jurisdictions are therefore examined for guidance on the way New 
Zealand should approach the problem. 
The English, Canadian and Australian courts take a restrictive approach 
to the art of parody. Parody is treated the same as any other form of 
copying, and will therefore usually be an infringement. 
The United States courts recognise the value of parody, and will protect 
it under their fair use defence. However there arc some problems with 
the United States approach. There is little definition of parody, and the 
most common definition is wider than suggested in this paper. As the 
courts are reluctant to define parody there is sometimes confusion 
between the issues of whether the work is a parody, and whether it 
should be protected by the fair use defence. The courts concentrate on 
the conjure up test as the test for deciding whether the fair use defence 
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applies in the circumstances. This is a limiting approach and it would be 
preferable to concentrate on the effect on the demand for the plaintiffs 
work. 
New Zealand should follow the United States' approach of allowing 
parody as fair dealing, but should develop a suitable parody definition 
and consider more appropriate factors. 
II COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
The Copyright Act 1962 section 6(1) defines copyright as the exclusive 
right to do and to authorise other persons to do certain acts in relation to 
that work. Section 6(2) provides that copyright is infringed by a person, 
not being the copyright owner, and without the licence of the owner who 
does or authorises certain acts in relation to the copyright work. The 
unauthorised acts are listed in sections 7(3) and 7( 4). 1 
To be an infringement the person must have made use of the form of 
expression. There is no infringement for the taking of ideas, as there is 
no copyright protection for ideas. 
In all jurisdictions there are general essential ingredients of copyright 
infringement. These are: 
1. Ownership of copyright by the plaintiff 
This involves showing originality in the author, copyrightability of the 
subject matter, citizenship status of the author such as to permit a claim 
of copyright, compliance with applicable statutory formalities and if the 
plaintiff is not the author, a transfer of rights or other relationship 
There are similar provisions in other jurisdictions. England: Copyright Act 1956 ss 
1, 2, and 3; Canada: Copyright Act 1985 ss 5 and 27(1 ); Australia: Copyright Act 
1968 ss 31 , 36 and 101(1); United States: Copyright Act 1976 s 106. 
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between the author and plaintiff so as to constitute the plaintiff the valid 
copyright claimant.2 
2. Copying 
(a) Causal Connection 
The copyright work must be the source from which the infringing work is 
derived.3 If there is no proof of copying it is assumed the work was 
created independently. There is no infringement no matter how closely 
the defendant's work resembles the plaintiffs work. 
Generally it is not thought possible to establish copying by direct 
evidence. It will be rare that the plaintiff has a witness to the act of 
copying. Also copying may occur without any physical manifestation, 
since copying from memory is no Jess actionable than copying from direct 
view.4 In most cases there is only indirect evidence of copying which 
"lies in the establishment of similarities between the plaintiffs work and 
defendant's work, combined with proof of access by the author of the 
alleged infringing work to the plaintiffs work".5 The more similarities 
there are, the greater the likelihood that the defendant has copied from 
the plaintiff.6 Copying is therefore inferred from the circumstances of 
the case. The causal link may also be established where the defendant 
has copied from an intermediate work, which is itself an infringement of 
the plaintiffs copyright. 
2 M B Nimmer and D Nimmer Nimmer on Copyright (Matthew, Bender & Co, New 
York, 1988) Vol 3 § 13:0l[AJ. 
3 P S Johnson v Bucko Enterprises (1975] 1 NZLR 311. 
4 Above n 2, Vo! 3 § 13.01[8]. 
5 Klissers Fann.house Bakeries Ltd v Harvest Bakeries /, td (No 2) (1985] 2 NZLR 143, 
158. 
6 PDL Packaging Ltd v Labplas (1987) 8 IPR 331 ,335. 
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(b) Substantial Similarity 
It is not necessary for infringement that the restricted act be done in 
relation to the whole work. The Copyright Act 1962 section 3(1) 
provides that infringement can also occur when the restricted act is done 
in relation to a substantial part of the copyright work.7 The issue for the 
court to decide is whether a substantial part of the plaintiffs work 
survives in the defendant's work as to appear a copy.8 
Difficult questions arise as to the amount of copying and degree of 
resemblance necessary to consist of appropriation of a substantial part. 
Whether the defendant has copied a substantial part depends much more 
on the quality, rather than the quantity of what was taken.9 
The reproduction of a small part of a work which has great originality 
will therefore be an infringement, whereas the reproduction of a part 
which by itself has no originality will not be a substantial part of the 
copyright work and will therefore not be protected. 10 The quality of the 
work relates to the things which give it, its specific individuality. 11 The 
test is designed to prevent a person reproducing the important and 
valuable part of the plaintiffs work, even though it is a small part of the 
work. 
It is helpful to distinguish between two types of similarity. 12 
7 This provision is a rule of Common Law. It is specified in the English Copyright 
Act 1956 s 49; Canadian Copyright Act 1985 s 3(1); Australian Copyright Act 1968 
s 14; but not in the United States Copyright Act 1976. 
8 WR Cornish Intellectual Property (Sweet & Maxwell , London , 1989) 290. 
9 Ladbroke (Football Ltd) v William Hill (Football) Ltd [1964] l WLR 273,276. 
10 Above n 9, 293. 
11 LB (Plastics) Ltd v Swish Products Ltd (1979] RPC 55 1,622. 
12 Above n 2, Vol 3 § t3.03(A). 
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1. Fragmented Literal Similarity 
This is where the defendant has copied all or part of the plaintiffs work, 
word for word. Proof of infringement is straight-forward. The only 
question is how much of the plaintiffs work can be copied literally. 
Applying the quality test, the proportion of the part copied to the whole 
of the plaintiffs work need not be large. 
2. Comprehensive Non-Literal Similarity 
The fundamental essence or structure of the plaintiffs work is duplicated 
in the defendant's work. The mere fact that the defendant has 
paraphrased rather than literally copied will not preclude a finding of 
substantial similarity. The court must be sure the copying is of the 
expression of the idea, which the defendant has attempted to disguise by 
alteration, rather than copying of abstract ideas which is not an 
infringement. 
It is entirely immaterial that in many respects the plaintiffs and 
defendant's works are dissimilar if in other respects similarity as to a 
substantial element of the plaintiffs work can be shown.13 The only 
question is the value of the similar material as it appears in the plaintiffs 
work, not the defendant's work. 
Determining whether a substantial part of the plaintiffs work has been 
taken is decided by the judge's impression, that is the ordinary observer 
test. No expert witnesses arc called. 
13 Above n 2, Vol 3 § l3.03[BJ. 
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III FAIR DEALING 
In New Zealand, as in other jurisdictions there is the statutory defence of 
fair dealing available. 14 The defence arises where a substantial part of 
the copyright work has been reproduced, that is, it would otherwise be an 
infringem en t.15 
There has been some confusion in the courts between substantial 
similarity and fair dealing. In England, before the Copyright Act 1911, 
the fair dealing exceptions were foreshadowed in case law as forms of 
fair use, a concept not clearly distinguished from insubstantial taking. 16 
Also some United States cases have stated that an insubstantial similarity 
was not actionable, as it was a fair use. 17 This is an incorrect approach. 
The defence originally developed in the Common Law. Historically fair 
dealing (or fair use as it is called in the United States) has always had to 
do with the use by the second author of the first author's work. 18 There 
is a problem with such uses as photocopying fitting within this, and it is 
better described as an exception. The defence therefore anticipates 
original thought by the defendant building on the use of the plaintiffs 
work. 
The rationale behind the defence is that it is needed in some 
circumstances to fulfil the object of copyright which is the promotion of 
creativity. The primary object of giving a monopoly through copyright 
protection is the belief that providing economic benefits to authors and 
14 New Zealand: Copyright Act ss 19, 20; England: Copyright Act ss 6, 9; Canada: 
Copyright Act 1985 s 27(2); Australia: Copyright Act 1968 ss 40-42; United States: 
Copyright Act 1976 s 107. 
15 Johnstone v Bernard Jones Publications Ltd [1938] Ch 599,603. 
16 Above n 8, 301. 
17 Above n 2, § 13.05. 
18 LE Seltzer Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 1978) 24. 
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other artists will encourage creativity, which is in the public interest. 19 
The traditional uses protected under this defence are also concerned with 
promoting learning and increasing knowledge. Fair dealing is a defence 
to infringement where these objects are not served by protecting the 
copyright owner.20 
It is rare for fair dealing to be defined. The Copyright Act 1962 does not 
define the term.21 A suggested definition is "a privilege in others than 
the owner of copyright, to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable 
manner without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the 
owner by the copyright".22 This is a very general definition. Whether a 
use is fair is determined by the court taking into consideration the 
circumstances of each case. The defence is very fact specific and 
different factors will be considered in different cases. This accounts for 
the view that it is impossible to give a definition that will fit every case. 
The use of the copyright work for certain types of purposes, for example, 
research or criticism may be fair dealing. These developed in the 
Common Law and are now codified in the Act. 
The New Zealand, English, Canadian and Australian Copyright Acts set 
out specific limited purposes for which a use may be fair dealing. Parody 
is not included in these lists. The limitation of purposes in regard to 
which the defence of fair dealing can be set up, probably did not alter 
19 Statute of Anne c 19 An Act for the encouragement of learning by vesting the 
copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers of such copies, during the 
times therein mentioned. United States Constitution Art I sec1ion 8, clause 8 gives 
Congress the power "To promote the progress of arts and sciences ... by securing 
for limited times to authors ... the exclusive rights to their writings". 
20 L R Yankwich "Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright '' 33 Can Bar Rev 
l 130,1132 (1955), 
21 Nor do the English, Canadian , Australian and United States Copyright Acts. 
22 I-I Ball The Law of Copyright and Literary Propeny ( 1944) 260. 
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the law, but it has prevented any attempt to extend the defence to new 
purposes.23 
The Copyright Act 1976 was the first American Copyright Act to codify 
fair use. The fair use provision, section 107 provides: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A 
the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by 
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other 
means specified in those sections, for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or 
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In 
determining whether the use made of a work in any 
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered 
shall include -
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is 
for non profit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
( 4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for 
or the value of the copyrighted work. 
This section instead of listing specific uses which can be fair use 
anticipates other uses than those specified may be fair use, by the 
language "for purposes such as". The Committee of the Judiciary listed 
examples to give some idea of the types of activities the courts might 
regard as fair use under the circumstances. Included is the use in a 
parody of some of the content of the work parodied.24 The list set out 
purposes which the courts in the past have regarded as fair use, 
23 WA Copinger and F E Skone James Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (1 2 
ed , Sweet & Maxwell , London , 1980) 513. 
24 Copyright Act 1976 s 107 Notes of the Committee of the Judiciary llouse Repon No 
94 1976. 
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depending on the facts of the case. The Act therefore, does not change 
the courts' position on fair use, nor did it intend to. 
The English courts have set out various factors to be considered to 
decide whether the copying is fair in a particular case. These have been 
accepted in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. The cases discussed 
considered whether the use was fair where the purpose was criticism. 
In Hubbard v Vosper Lord Denning set out three factors to be 
considered.25 
1. The number and extent of quotations and extracts. 
2. The use made of them. 
3. The proportions of extracts to comments. 
He also thought other considerations might come to mind. 
In Beloff v Pressdram the court approved Hubbard v Vosper and 
considered similar factors , whether it was an approved purpose, the 
amount and value of what was taken and the proportion of what was 
taken to comments.26 
In earlier English cases, another factor considered important was the 
likelihood of the works entering into competition with each other, the 
market of the copyright work being affected .27 This may be an 
underlying, though not expressly spelt out factor in recent English cases. 
In the United States the Copyright Act 1976 section 107 sets out four 
factors to be included in determining whether the use in a particular case 
is fair. The section gives no guidance as to the weight to be given each 
25 [1972) 2 QB 84,94. 
26 [1973] RPC 765,786-787. 
27 Weatherby v International Horse A gency [1910] 2 Ch 297,305. 
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factor. Factors other than those set out in the section may be 
considered. 
The United States courts emphasise that a commercial purpose militates 
against fair use. This was laid down in Sony Corp v Universal City Studios 
Jnc28 and Harper & Row Publishers Inc v Nation Enterprises.29 
Sony Corp involved owners of copyright in television programmes suing 
manufactures of home video recorders alleging that individuals used them 
to record copyrighted works. The manufacturers were alleged to be 
liable for infringement because they sold the recorders. The Supreme 
Court emphasised that if the Betamax recorders were used to make 
copies for a commercial purpose, such use was presumed unfair. But in 
this case the contrary presumption applied as it was a non-commercial 
use.30 The majority also found there was no harm to the potential 
market for or the value of the copyright work. 
The Court laid down the commercial/non-commercial distinction to assist 
in a finding of fair use. 
This decision does not fit within the traditional fair use idea of the 
second work using and building on the original. The case involved total 
copying. It would have been better to leave the legislature to solve the 
problem by charging a royalty on blank tapes, home video taping being 
impossible to regulate. 
Nation was a case where the copyright owner of a former President's 
memoirs who had sold the exclusive rights to print pre-published excerpts 
to a national magazine, alleged infringement where another magazine 
28 78 L Ed 2d 574 (1984). 
29 85 L Ed 2d 588 ( l 985). 
30 Above n 28, 597. 
- 11 -
acquired a copy and rushed it into print, leading the first magazine to 
cancel the contract. 
The Supreme Court rejected the argument of fair use and found an 
infringement. The fact that the publication was commercial rather than 
non-profit weighed against fair use.31 The crux of the profit/non-profit 
distinction is not whether the sole motive is for monetary gain, but 
whether the user stands to profit from the exploitative use of copyright 
without paying the customary price.32 The Court therefore rejected the 
defendant's argument that the primary motive was news reporting. 
All jurisdictions emphasise the amount taken as a relevant factor in 
determining fair use. This appears to be a reapplication of the 
substantial similarity test. As fair dealing is a defence to infringement, 
which involves the taking of a substantial part of the plaintifrs work, the 
amount taken should only be relevant to the extent that the defendant's 
work becomes a substitute for the plaintiffs work. The defendant's work 
must have input from the defendant to be a fair use. 
IV PARODY 
The term parody refers to a humorous work where the humour is derived 
from the mocking imitation of other, usually serious works.33 In this 
31 Above n 29, 608. 
32 Above n 31. 
33 S N Light 'Parody, Burlesque and the Economic Rationale for Copyright ' 11 Conn 
LR 615,616. 
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paper, the term parody will cover both parody and burlesque. The two 
terms do have different technical meanings. 34 
Their common feature is that they depend for their existence on the 
opportunity to copy other works.35 They are of a parasitic nature. The 
success of a parody depends on its perceived relationship with a familiar 
work. Without recognition of the thing being ridiculed, the audience will 
not appreciate the parodist's point of view. 
Not all parodies depend on copying which is substantial enough to raise a 
copyright cause of action.36 Most parodies by their nature depend upon 
the use of a substantial part of a copyright work and it is this 
characteristic which brings the parodist into conflict with the copyright 
owner. 
Copyright gives a copyright owner, property rights in his/her work, the 
most important of which is the right to make and distribute copies of the 
work, which may be exercised or transferred as thought fit. Anyone 
other than the copyright owner who exercises these rights is liable for 
copyright infringement. Conflict therefore exists between the copyright 
34 From the Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford , 1989). 
burlesque: That species of literary composition, or of dramatic representation 
which aims at exciting laughter by caricature of the manner or spirit of serious 
works, or by ludicrous treatment of their subjects; a literary or dramatic work of 
this kind. 
parody: A composition in prose or verse in which the characteristic turns of 
thought and phrase in an author or class of authors are imitated in such a way as 
to make them appear ridiculous, especially by applying them to ludicrously 
inappropriate subjects; an imitation of a work more or less closely modelled on the 
original, but so turned as to produce a ridiculous effect. Also applied to a 
burlesque of a musical work. 
Burlesque imitates the style of the work burlesqued for the purpose of poking fun 
by applying the style to some topical subject other than the original work. Parody 
focuses on both the style and subject matter of the work imitated, drawing humour 
and insight from subtle variations which expose weaknesses of the original. 
35 Above n 33. 
36 S L Faaland 'Parody and Fair Use: The Critical Question ' 57 Wash L Rev 163 
(1981 ). 
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holder's exclusive right to control and therefore prevent copying of the 
work, and the parodist's need to use the work to create an independent 
work. It may be assumed that a copyright owner would not often wish to 
licence a parody, as it most likely involves ridicule of his/her work. 
As it is based on copying, parody is subject to the copyright owner's right 
to control reproduction of his/her work, and is an infringement, unless it 
is allowed as an exception under the fair dealing defence. 
There are different types of parody. These different kinds make 
different demands on copyright owners and serve literature and the 
public in different ways.37 
1. A parodist takes a specific work and parodies its style, 
mannerisms and subject. 
2. A work which parodies only a style concentrating on an 
exaggerating its eccentricities. 
3. A work which uses a copyright work as a vehicle for social, 
political or literary criticism. 
4. A work which mocks an entire genre. The author draws on many 
works to concoct his/her version of the genre. 
5. A work where the parody lies not in the text alone, but in the text 
and context. 
Each type differs from the other in the use it makes of the source text 
and in the target of its criticism. 
37 J Bisceglia 'Parody and Copyright Protection: T urnin g the Balancing Act into a 
Juggling Act' 34 Copyright L Symp (ASCAP) l ,7 (1984). 
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Parody has made many exceptional contributions to literature and art, 
and is traditionally recognised as an independent art form. Both parody 
and burlesque have a long history. Parody developed in ancient Greece 
and burlesque has been popular since the late sixteenth century.38 
Some parodies have become more famous than the work they ridiculed. 
For example, Don Quixote a now famous novel in its own right began as 
a parody on the Spanish novel of chivalry. Many famous authors wrote 
parodies, for example Shakespeare parodied Marlowe. Burlesque was 
common in the theatre in the nineteenth century. Important plays often 
brought forth a corresponding burlesque.39 
There is some debate as to the appropriate legal definition of parody. 
The definition becomes important where it is possible for a parody to be 
protected by the fair dealing defence. 
Some authors believe that parody is used to encompass any form of 
critical or humorous expression that depends on an existing work of 
authorship for its creation and contains independent effort.40 A parody 
may therefore be only humorous and have no critical comment. 
The writer prefers the alternative view that the real value o( parody to 
society lies not in its humour, but in its criticism. A parody is usually 
funny, but not all funny adaptions of a work are a parody.41 By 
ridiculing other works or an aspect of life in a humorous way, the 
parodist draws attention to the faults in the style and content of a work 
or in society. The parodist leads the audience to see the original work 
from another perspective. 
38 Above n 20, 1134. 
39 Above n 20, 1134-1136. 
40 M A Clemmons 'Author v Parodist: Striking a Compromise ' 33 Copyright L Symp 
(ASCAP) 85 (1983). 
41 Above n 36, 164; Above n 37, 22; Above n 20, 1131. 
- 15 -
The writer submits that a parody ought to be defined as a work which 
takes for the purpose of literary or social criticism, and does this in a 
humorous way, making some alteration to the original for this end. 
Although parody is traditionally viewed as an independent art form, its 
parasitic nature means there is the potential for conflict with the 
copyright owner. The way copyright law treats parody could have a 
major impact on its present and future development. Parody could be 
destroyed, by constantly being seen as a copyright infringement, or 
alternatively, protected by the fair dealing defence. 
V TREATMENT OF PARODIES IN ENGLAND 
The English courts treat parody the same as any other form of copying. 
The ordinary infringement test is applied, that is , it is an infringement if 
it takes a substantial part of the original work. 
There are few cases alleging infringement by parody in English law. 
In an early case, Glyn v Weston Feature Film Co42 Mr Justice Younger 
suggested a more lenient approach towards parody. The plaintiff was the 
author of the novel Three Weeks. She alleged that the defendant's 
farcical film Pimple's Three Weeks (without the Option) was an 
infringement. It was held that the defendant had not taken a substantial 
part of the plaintiffs work so there was no infringement. The defendant 
argued the film was a burlesque of the plaintiffs novel and therefore was 
not an infringement, it was a new work.43 
Mr Justice Younger noted that it was remarkable there were no cases 
where a burlesque had been found an infringement considering its age 
42 [1916) 1 Ch 261. 
43 Above n 42, 263. 
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and popularity.44 Two burlesque or parody cases prior to Glyn 
sometimes cited by authors,45 are Hanfstaengl v Empire Palace46 and 
Francis, Day and Hunter v Feldman.41 In these cases, burlesque or 
parody were not argued as defences to the infringement actions, nor were 
the cases decided on this basis. 
In Hanfstaengl two newspapers sent artists to the Empire theatre to make 
rough sketches of an exhibition of tableaux vivants, that is, where modern 
paintings were reproduced by having a painted background, a gilt frame 
and actors in the positions of the people in the paintings. The plaintiff 
was the copyright owner of five of these paintings and alleged the 
defendants had infringed copyright through indirect copying.48 The 
sketches were found not to infringe the plaintiffs copyright, because they 
were rough sketches which did not copy the artistic merits of the 
original.49 The quality of the original works were not reproduced, Lord 
Justice Lindley noted that the amusing sketches in Punch of the pictures 
in the Royal Academy were not infringements.50 This was because 
those sketches, as in this case, did not take a substantial part of the 
plaintiffs work. This reference to Punch sketches seems the only 
comment of relevance to parody. 
In Francis, Day and Hunter v Feldman the copyright owners of the song 
You Made Me Love You (/ Di.dn 't Want To Do It) alleged infringement by 
the reply song You Di.dn 't Want To Do It, But You Di.d. On appeal, it was 
44 Above n 42, 268. 
45 Above n 20, 1139-1143. 
46 (1 894] 3 Ch 109. 
47 [1914] 2 Ch 728. 
48 The plaintiff had failed in the earlier case of Hanfstaengl v Empire Palace (1 894] 2 
Ch 1 to prove infringement by the theatre. 
49 Above n 46, 132; 134. 
50 Above n 46, 130. 
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decided that on a comparison of the two songs there was no 
infringement.51 Therefore, this case was decided on the basis of 
substantial similarity. 
Mr Justice Younger suggested reasons for the non-infringement of 
parody. He suggested the principle "that no infringement of the 
plaintiffs rights takes place where a defendant has bestowed such mental 
labour upon what he has taken and has subjected it to such revision and 
alteration as to produce an original result".52 This statement has 
sometimes been taken for authority for the general proposition that 
parody can never constitute an infringement.53 Arguably Mr Justice 
Younger is just setting out the basic requirement that infringement only 
occurs when a substantial part has been taken. He goes on to set out 
this test.54 However, the statement take alone suggests an illegitimate 
idea of the infringement test. An infringement occurs where the 
defendant has taken a substantial part of the plaintiffs work and it is 
irrelevant that the defendant may have produced some original work. 
In Carlton v Mortimer55 the copyright owner of the novel Tarzan of the 
Apes sued the defendant for a production of a comic acrobatic 
performance under the title Warzan and His Apes. The judge noted that 
only two incidents of the performance were taken from the novel. He 
was satisfied that a burlesque of these trifling incidents was not an 
infringement. The case was decided applying the substantial similarity 
test. He felt Mr Justice Younger was going too far if he understood him 
to be saying a burlesque could never be an infringement.56 
51 Above n 47, 734. 
52 Above n 42, 268. 
53 S Ricketson The Law of lntellectual Propeny (The Law Book Co, Sydney, 1984) 
201. 
54 Above n 42, 269. 
55 [ 191 7-1923] Macg Cop Cas 194. 
56 Above n 55, 195. 
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In the later case of Joy Music Ltd v Sunday Pictorial Newspapers (1920) 
Ltd57 Mr Justice McNair cited the Glyn dicta with approval. The 
plaintiff was the copyright owner of the popular song Rock-a-Billy and 
alleged the defendant had infringed copyright by the parody Rock-a-
Philip, which was in support of Prince Philip who had been criticised for 
his participation in dangerous sports. The only similarities between the 
two works were the verse structure and rhythm , and in a small part of 
the chorus, the words Rock-a-Billy, rock were changed to Rock-a-Philip, 
rock. The plaintiff argued this was the essential part of the song. The 
defendant argued alternately, that it was not a substantial part and as a 
parody it was protected by the Glyn dicta. 
After noting that there was no reported decision on the question whether 
a parody of a copyright work is an infringement, Mr Justice McNair 
stated that Glyn provided him with a clear indication as to the way this 
question should be decided.58 In this case applying the Glyn test would 
lead to the conclusion that the defendant's parody was not an 
infringement. Though the defendant's work had its origin in Rock-a-Billy 
"it was produced by sufficient independent new work by Paul Boyle to be 
in itself, not a reproduction of the original 'Rock-a-Billy', but a new, 
original work derived from 'Rock-a-Billy"'. 59 
In Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Anglo Amalgamated Film 
Distributors Ltd60 Mr Justice Plowman reluctantly applied the Glyn test. 
The plaintiffs were producers of the film Cleopatra and for advertising 
purposes had posters of a scene of Cleopatra lying on a divan with 
Antony and Caesar in the background. The defendants were producers 
of the film Carry on Cleo and produced a poster similar to the plaintiffs, 
the only difference being different actors were used. The judge noted 
57 [1960] 2 QB 60. 
58 Above n 57, 70. 
59 Above n 57, 71. 
60 The Times, London , England , 22 January 1%5. 
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that it was important to bear in mind that the test was suggested in 
relation to literary, not artistic copyright. But even applying the test it 
did not displace the view one would form on a visual comparison, that is, 
the defendants' poster did reproduce a material part of the plaintiffs' 
poster. 
This case could have been dealt with by rejecting the defendants' 
argument of parody. Their poster appears to be nothing more than 
straight copying. 
More recent cases have firmly rejected the Glyn test. It has been 
described as the high water mark of any liberty allowed towards 
parody.61 
Schweppes Ltd v Wellingtons Ltd62 involved the use of the distinctive 
Indian tonic water label on the defendant's tonic water bubble bath. The 
defendant's label was substantially similar to the plaintiffs, the only 
difference was the defendant's label bore the name Schlurppes instead of 
Schweppes. The plaintiff alleged artistic copyright had been infringed, 
while the defendant argued it was intended as a joke, the label being a 
parody and therefore not an infringement applying the Glyn test. 
After finding substantial similarity, Mr Justice Falconer rejected the Glyn 
test as an incorrect statement of law. "The test every time in my 
judgment is, as the statute makes perfectly plain: Has there been a 
reproduction in the defendant's work of a substantial part of the 
plaintiffs work?".63 He interpreted Joy Music Ltd as being decided on 
this basis. There was no substantial similarity because there was no 
61 Williamson Music Ltd v The Pearson Partnership Ltd [ I 987] FSR 97, l 04. 
62 (1984] FSR 210. 
63 Above n 62, 212. 
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reproduction of the words or any part of the plaintiffs song.64 If the 
case was to be explained on any other basis it was wrongly decided. 
As there was no real defence to the infringement claim in this case, 
summary judgment was awarded to the plaintiff. As Jeremy Phillips 
noted, it is difficult to see how this was a case of parody. It is not an 
attempt to ridicule or poke fun at the plaintiffs product, but rather an 
attempt to cash in on consumer familiarity with the plaintiffs product as 
a means of enhancing the defendant's sales.65 
In Williamson Music Ltd v The Pearson Partnership Ltd66 the copyright 
owner of the song There is Nothin' Like a Dame alleged infringement by 
the defendant's television advertisement and moved for an interlocutory 
injunction. The defendant argued that the lyrics and music were 
deliberately created to parody the plaintiffs song and in the result there 
was no infringement. 
The judge approved the test laid down by Mr Justice Falconer. A 
substantial part of the lyrics had not been taken, so the literary copyright 
was not infringed. Regarding the musical copyright, it was arguable that 
a substantial part of the original was in the advertisement, so there was a 
serious question to be tried. 
The judge made some interesting comments on the nature of parody.67 
1. A parodist may take an idea and from it a completely new and 
original work may be created. 
64 Above n 62, 213. The judge referred to the words of McNair J in Joy Music Ltd v 
Sunday Pictorial Newspapers (1920) Ltd [ I 960] 2 QB 60,69. 
65 J Phillips 'The Parody Defence to Copyright Infringement' 43 Cam L J 245,247 
(1984). 
66 [1987] FSR 97. 
67 Above n 66, 103. 
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2. The parodist may be indulging in literary criticism or review of 
the original work. The point did not arise in this case, so there 
was no need to deal with any sort of defence under the fair 
dealing exception. 
The first proposition misses the point about the problem of parody in 
copyright law. Parody usually involves the copying of the form of 
expression, and it is this feature which brings the parodist into conflict 
with the copyright owner. 
The second proposition suggests that if the judge had been faced with a 
parody with a critical element it could be protected under the existing 
statutory fair dealing defence. 
The judge was referred to the United States authority of Berlin v EC 
Publications Inc. 68 He emphasised that the case was decided on the 
basis of substantial similarity, but did not acknowledge that the dicta was 
suggesting a test for deciding whether a particular parody fitted within 
the fair use defence. It seems odd that counsel did not quote later 
United States authorities that clearly support that a parody may be a fair 
use. 
English law therefore adopts a strict approach towards parody. A parody 
will be a copyright infringement if it takes a substantial part of the 
copyright work. Williamson Music Ltd offers a slim hope that a true 
parody may be exempted from copyright infringement under the existing 
fair dealing defence because it is for the purpose of criticism. It is 
unknown whether courts will apply this in the f uturc. 
68 219 F Supp 911 (1963); affirmed 3'.!9 F '.!d 541 (1964). 
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VI TREATMENT OF PARODIES IN CANADA 
The Canadian courts, like the English, give parodies no special treatment. 
They are infringements if they take a substantial part of the copyright 
work. 
In Ludlow Music Inc v Canint Music Corp Ltd69 there was an action for 
an order restraining the defendant from selling records using the tune of 
the composition This Land is Your Land with different lyrics. The Court 
held that the Copyright Act 1952 section 19 did not authorise a recording 
of the tune with new lyrics, since a song is both the tune and lyrics.70 
The defendant had argued that there were separate copyrights in the 
lyrics and tune and as the firm were not using the plaintiffs lyrics there 
was no infringement.71 In dicta, the judge assumed the plaintiff would 
argue the new lyrics involved a substantial taking and were therefore an 
infringement. The defendant asserted the lyrics were a parody because 
they chided the Canadian Government and people for alleged feelings of 
inferiority. The judge would have decided this issue in accordance with 
the type of reasoning in Joy Music Ltd, whether the new lyrics are a new 
composition or a mere adaptation of the plaintifCs work. 72 
In later cases the courts do not refer to the Glyn/Joy Music Ltd test and 
decide the issue on the usual substantial similarity test. 
69 62 DLR (2d) 200 ( I 967). 
70 In other jurisdictions, including New Zealand , there are separate copyrights in the 
lyrics as a literary work and the tune as a musical work . See Brown and Grant 
The Law of Jntellec111al Propeny in New Zealand ( Butterworths, Wellington , 1989) 
237. 
71 Above n 69, 214. The defendant alleged the use of tune was authorised in effect 
bys 19. The defendant had agreed in earlier correspondence to pay royalties for 
the tune. 
72 Above n 69, 215. 
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In MCA Canada Ltd v Gillberry & Hawke Advertising73 the copyright 
owner of the musical work Downtown alleged infringement by the 
defendant's parody of the lyrics, set to the tune, in an advertisement for a 
car dealership. Normally advertisers could obtain a licence that 
permitted a parody of the work in an advertisement. There was a system 
where various types of licences were issued and monitored by the 
CAPAC (Composers, Authors and Publishers Association). The 
defendant agency had not obtained a licence and was held to have 
caused the parody to be prepared and performed as a blatant 
infringement, in disregard of the rights of the others and was liable for 
both damages and punitative damages.74 Parody is therefore treated as 
any other form of copying. 
In Rotisseries St-Hubert v Le Syndical des Travailleurs75 the plaintiff was 
the owner of copyright in the design of a stylized head of a chicken and 
signature. During a labour dispute the defendant used a parody of the 
plaintiffs work on pamphlets distributed. The Court held that the 
defendant's work was an infringement. While the parody was not an 
exact reproduction, it reproduced a substantial portion of the work. The 
plaintiff therefore obtained damages and a permanent injunction. 
VII TREATMENT OF PARODIES IN AUSTRALIA 
The Australian courts also follow the strict English approach towards 
parodies. 
73 (1977) 28 CPR (2d) 52. 
74 No penalty was imposed on the author of the parody. I le was thought to have 
exhibited naivety in accepting the defendant 's offer. 
75 (1986) 17 CPR (3d) 461. 
LAW LI BRARY 
Vl '":.TO:llA UiJIVERSITY (_,f V.'[Lllr ;c, TON 
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In United Features Syndicate Inc v Star Newspaper Pty Ltd76 the plaintiff 
was the copyright owner of the cartoon strip Peanuts featuring the 
character Charlie Brown. The defendant, publisher of a magazine called 
Ribald produced a comic strip Charlie Brum. The plaintiff instituted 
proceedings for an interlocutory injunction. The defendant had 
substantially taken the plaintiffs cartoon character, but changed the 
theme and storyline, to that of a salacious nature. 
The defendant argued the work was a parody, but the court referring to 
the Glyn test rejected this. The court was satisfied that the defendant's 
work was not an original result, it merely took the original copyright work 
and turned it to a salacious and unpleasant end.77 
In the recent case of AGL Sydney Ltd v Short/and County Council,78 
although it was held the defendant's work was a reply not a parody, Mr 
Justice Foster discussed the parody cases. After noting that the Glyn test 
appears to have won general acceptance, he stated it is of the essence of 
parody that the work parodied must be evoked in the mind of the hearer 
or viewer to fulfil the purpose of the parodist. The question must 
necessarily remain whether an infringement of copyright has occurred as 
a result of a substantial taking from the plaintiffs work. The Copyright 
Act grants no exemption for parody or burlesque.79 
VIII TREATMENT OF PARODIES IN THE USA 
The United States courts have a different approach to parodies. They 
are recognised as deserving of special treatment. They may fit under the 
76 NSWSC No 2637 of 1977. 
77 J Lahore Intellectual Property in Australia. Copyright ( Butterworths, Sydney 1977) 
Update Service, April 1980, 92. 
78 (1989) 17 IPR 99. 
79 Above n 78, 105. 
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fair use defence provided they fulfil the criteria. The balancing function 
of fair use is clearly an appropriate approach to the competing artistic 
claims of the parodist and his or her victims.80 
A. Development of Present Approach 
The first case in which the conflict on parody was presented was Loews 
Incorporated v Columbia Broadcasting System. 81 Previously in some cases 
involving imitation there had been dicta supporting special treatment for 
parodies.82 
In Loews the plaintiff had copyright in the motion picture Gaslight and 
alleged that the defendant's humorous sketch on television was an 
infringement. The defendant argued as the sketch was a parody, it 
escaped liability, by coming under the fair use defence. 
The issue facing the court was whether a parody which takes a 
substantial part of a work is a fair use. The court decided the issue in 
the negative. A "parodized or burlesqued taking is to be treated no 
differently from any other appropriation".83 The defendant's sketch was 
found to be an infringement of copyright. 
This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit). The 
Court of Appeal noted "The fact that a serious, dramatic work is copied 
practically verbatim and then presented with actors walking on their 
80 Above n 36, 168. 
81 131 F Supp 165 (1955); affirmed 239 F 2d 532 (1956); affirmed 356 US 43 (1958). 
82 For example, in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co v P F Collier & Son Co ?.6 USPQ 40,43 
(SDNY 1934) it was said "Mimicry, editorial comment , and parodies are other 
instances or varieties of fair use" . See W F Patry The Fair Use Privilege in 
Copyright Law (Bureau of National Affairs, Washington DC' 1985) 48-52 for 
further examples. 
83 131 F Supp 165,183. 
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hands or with other grotesqueries, does not avoid infringement of the 
copyright".84 
Soon after the District Court decision in Loews, the same court decided 
the case of Columbia Pictures Corp v National Broadcasting Co.85 This 
involved the television burlesque From Here to Obscurity of the film From 
Here to Eternity. The plaintiff alleged infringement. 
The Court sets out confusing reasoning but appears to decide the use 
made in the burlesque was permissible as it did not constitute the taking 
of a substantial part of the plaintiffs work.86 Earlier in the reasoning, 
the Court suggested principles on which a burlesque or parody case 
should be decided.87 In a burlesque of copyrighted material, there must 
be sufficient use of the original to recall or conjure it up, and the law 
permits more extensive use in the creation of a burlesque, than another 
serious work, by allowing it the fair use defence if appropriate on the 
facts. 
Berlin v EC Publications Jnc88 involved the publication in Mad, a 
satirical humour magazine, a collection of parody lyrics of 57 old 
standard songs. They were divided into categories such as business and 
education, so were parodies on an aspect of life. The subject matter of 
the defendant's lyrics were completely different from the plaintiffs. 
After the title of each set of lyrics, a statement indicated the aspect of 
modern life the lyrics were intending to satirize. Then there were the 
words "sing to the tune of' and the title of an old standard song was 
inserted. 
84 239 F 2d 532,536. 
85 137 F Supp 348 (1955). 
86 Above n 85, 352. 
87 Above n 85, 350. 
88 Above n 68. 
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The District Court applied the strict Loews test and found that a 
substantial taking had not occurred. This was affirmed in the Court of 
Appeals (Second Circuit), but the Court noted that the Loews decision, 
that a parody could not be justified as a fair use had been severely 
criticised. The Court stated:89 
"[W]e believe that parody and satire are deserving of 
substantial freedom - both as entertainment and as a form 
of social and literary criticism .... At the very least, where, 
as here, it is clear that the parody has neither the intent 
nor the effect of fulfilling the demand for the original, and 
where the parodist does not appropriate a greater amount 
of the original work than is necessary to "recall or conjure 
up" the object of his satire, a finding of infringement 
would be improper." 
This dicta has subsequently been applied. Now in United States law a 
parody may have the defence of fair use. 
The decision emphasised the two elements of parody, and suggested 
there is a parody, deserving of a defence where it is only a form of 
entertainment. The Court also set out the two tests that subsequent 
courts have used in deciding whether a parody in the particular 
circumstances is a fair use. These are the "conjure-up test" (third factor) 
and the "effect on demand test" (fourth factor). The Court did not 
address the question of how much was legitimately necessary to conjure 
up the copyright work and later decisions have struggled with this 
question. 
B. Parody Definition 
The courts do not often discuss the definition of parody. In Berlin the 
Court emphasised the entertainment aspect of parody as worth 
protecting. Also in Elsmere Music Inc v National Broadcasting Co90 the 
Court of Appeals (Second Circuit) thought that a parody uses the 
89 329 F 2d 541 ,545. 
90 428 F Supp 741 (1980); affirmed 623 F 2d 252 ( l 980). 
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original as a known element of modern culture and contributes 
something new for humorous effect or commentary.91 The humorous 
element of parody was emph~sised as deserving of protection. 
The Court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v Showcase Atlanta Co-op 
Productions, Inc defined parody as a work in which the language or style 
of another work is closely imitated for comic effect or ridicule and in 
which some critical comment is made reflecting the original work of the 
parodist.92 The Court believed that the underlying rationale of applying 
the fair use doctrine to parody is that this art form involves the type of 
original critical comment meant to be protected by section 107. 
Otherwise any comic use of an existing work could be protected, 
removing the fair aspect of the fair use doctrine. To be a parody and 
therefore have the possibility of fair use protection, the defendant's work 
must have social value beyond its entertainment function. 
In this case, the Court decided that the defendant's musical Scarlett Fever, 
based on the novel and film Gone With the Wind was not the sort of 
original critical comment meant to be protected by the fair use defence. 
The work was not a parody, it was just a comical musical adaption. 
The Atlanta Showcase decision has not been followed. The writer 
submits that this case gives the preferred definition of parody. The 
critical function of parody is it's merit, and it is this the law should 
protect. The wider definition of parody adopted by the United States' 
courts seems to have resulted in a very limited amount of taking under 
the "conjure up" test before a parody can be fair use. 
It is vital to have a statutory or judicially consistent definition of parody, 
so that a true parody may be protected, while the parody argument 
cannot be used as a mere subterfuge for appropriation of another 
91 623 F 2d 252,253. 
92 479 F Supp 351 ,357 (1979). 
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person's creation. The definition the United States courts favour gives a 
parodist protection where his or her work is only humorous and has no 
critical comment. Allowing fair use for merely funny adaptions is too 
severe an encroachment on the copyright owner's rights.93 
Parody can be a very powerful form of criticism. A critique of a work or 
aspect of society promotes thought and analysis by the public and other 
artists. This will lead to the creation of other original and interesting 
works. 
Allowing only a true parody, that which has critical comment, as a fair 
use remains consistent with other purposes for which the defence is 
allowed. These other purposes are concerned with promoting learning 
and the expansion of knowledge. A humorous adaption may be 
entertaining, but it will not educate or inform the public, which is what 
traditional fair use defences require. 
Other academics suggest there should be a distinction between protected 
and non-protected parodies on commercial grounds. There is a 
distinction between comic adaptions for monetary gain and true parody. 
Two different motivations are seen for a parodist. The first is the desire 
to utilise the copyright owner's work for financial gain, the second is 
where the parodist is motivated by artistic goals with financial gain as a 
secondary factor. 94 
This is an unworkable distinction. Whether an author sought to make a 
profit is irrelevant to the issue of whether the work is a parody.95 A 
parodist should be entitled to work for financial gain, not just artistic 
fulfilment and most users have some commercial motive. 
93 Above n 36, 164. 
94 R T Nimmer 'Reflections on the Problem of Parody-Infringement ' 17 Copyright L 
Symp (ASCAP) 133,152 (1969). 
95 Above n 37, 19. 
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The general United States approach of partly deciding fair use by the 
commercial/non-commercial distinction is also considered incorrect.96 
The only relevance the commercial success of the second work should 
have is where it affects the demand for the original work. 
Parody ought to be defined by the legal system, to emphasise the 
requirement of critical comment. The courts should be able to 
distinguish between criticism and humour to decide whether the 
defendant's work is a parody. This would be assisted by the defendant 
having the burden of showing what the parody was criticising. A 
defendant's inability to explain this, would alert the Court to an attempt 
to use the parody defence as a sham. It is suggested that the test for 
determining whether the work is a parody is whether the reasonably 
perceptive viewer can see its critique.97 Although the critical point of a 
parody is in the eye of the beholder, that is , dependent on the individual, 
to be an effective parody, most of the audience must see its point. 
Once the work has been determined to be a parody, it is a purpose for 
which the fair use defence exists. The other fair use factors must be 
considered to determine whether the parody is a fair use in the particular 
circumstances of the case. 
There is no distinction in United States law between long and short 
works argued to be parodies. A long work, for example a play, can be a 
parody and therefore receive immunity from an infringement action. 
In Atlanta Showcase there was no suggestion that the court rejected the 
parody argument, because of the length of the alleged parody. Rather it 
was because there was such extensive copying by following the plot, and 
copying specific incidents and dialogue of the original work. The parodist 
cannot copy the general story line and development, while parodying a 
96 See n 28 and n 29 and accompanying text. 
97 Above n 36, 190. 
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few incidents of the work. The work must overall be a parody, to have 
the possibility of the fair use defence.98 This type of reasoning would 
also apply to shorter parodies. 
It is not the length of the alleged parody that matters, but rather that the 
defendant's work overall parodies the plaintiffs work. 
The United States courts disallow a work as a parody, where there is 
complete copying. 
In Walt Disney v Mature Pictures Corp the Court rejected the possibility 
that where there was complete copying of the plaintiffs work, such a 
work was a parody.99 In this case, the plaintiffs Mickey Mouse March 
was played over and over again as background music. 
This result has been criticised as a work may be parodied by context 
alone. For example, in an anti-war review where The Ballad of the Green 
Berets ( a military song) is performed by people dressed as gorillas in 
uniform. This could be an effective critical commentary on the values 
underlying the song.100 
The Mature Pictures approach makes critical commentary by context 
impossible. Cases in which a whole work needs to be taken will be rare, 
but should be considered a parody, because of the biting criticism 
possible. 
Another aspect of the parody definition which is disputed is what a 
parodist may parody. 
98 Above n 92, 360. This was also the view expressed in Columbia Piclllres Corp v 
National Broadcasting Co 137 F Supp 348,350. 
99 389 F Supp 1397,1398 (1975). 
100 Above n 36, 187. 
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In MCA v Wilson 101 the copyright owner of the song the Boogie Woogie 
Bugle Boy of Company B alleged infringement by the defendant's song the 
Cunnilingus Champion of Company C. The defendant argued the song 
took an innocent style of music and combined it with words on a taboo 
subject to make a funny point. By making fun of 1940s music the work 
parodied the sexual taboos of today. The District Court rejected the 
argument on the ground the defendant may have sought to parody life, 
but the work did not attempt to comment on the copyright work 
itself.102 The plaintiff therefore won the case. 
This approach was rejected in Elsmere Music. The plaintiff was the 
owner of the/ Love New York advertising jingle which was the slogan of 
an advertising campaign to rescue the ailing city's tourism trade. The 
defendant television network allowed a comedy sketch to be performed. 
This sketch involved citizens of Sodom discussing the city's image 
problems and the effect on the tourist trade. The remedy was the 
advertising campaign using the song/ Love Sodom. 
The defendant's work was substantially similar to the plaintiffs so the 
decision hinged on the parody defence. The plaintiff argued that as the 
defendant did not attempt to parody the song I Love New York itself, it 
was not the type of parody that could get legal protection. The Court 
considered that the defendant's song was as much a parody on the 
plaintiffs song, as it was of the overall campaign. Even if/ Love Sodom 
did not parody the plaintiffs song itself, that would not preclude a finding 
of fair use.103 
In the MCA v Wilson Court of Appeal (Second Circuit) decision the 
majority rejected the dictum of going too far. "[A] permissible parody 
101 425 F Supp 443 (1976); affirmed 677 F 2d 180 ( 1981). 
102 425 F Supp 443,445. This was also the view in Walt Disney v Mature Pictures Corp 
389 F Supp 1397. 
103 428 F Supp 741 ,746. 
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need not be directed solely to the copyrighted song, but may also reflect 
life in general. However if the copyrighted work is not at least in part an 
object of the parody there is no need to conjure it up. 11104 
The writer prefers the Elsmere Music dictum. The law should recognise 
that different types of parodies exist and that they are all deserving of the 
same freedom. The defendant might have a logical reason for conjuring 
up a work, without intending to parody the work itself, for example, with 
a song, recalling a mood by the type of music used. 105 Where the 
parody criticises society in general, the defendant must show that the 
work chosen was a particularly appropriate vehicle to make this criticism. 
The defendant has a broad range of work from which to choose his or 
her vehicle, some perhaps not copyrighted, and he or she should be 
required to prove the necessity of his/her particular choice. 106 
C. Conjure Up Test 
This test involves a special application of the third factor in section 107. 
Applying this factor for other uses, the courts will consider the amount 
taken in proportion to the original work done by the defendant. This 
type of consideration is only appropriate to determine that the 
defendant's work is not a substitute for the plaintifrs work. The conjure 
up test appears to be more limiting. It only allows the parodist to take 
the minimum necessary to enable the audience to recall the original. 
This test is commonly applied in parody cases but the courts have been 
reluctant to establish its boundaries. This tendency to concentrate on the 
third factor has meant there have been few cases where the parodist has 
succeeded. Also when the content of the parody is less than socially 
acceptable (in the judge's eyes) the test has shown its weakness. 107 
104 677 F 2d 180,185. 
105 Above n 36, 185-186. 
106 Above n 36, 191. 
107 Above n 36, 175. 
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In MCA v Wilson, if the work had been a parody the District Court 
would have applied the conjure up test. The Court would have decided 
against fair use as the defendant's work not only conjured up the original 
memory of the plaintiffs work, it shared some of the same lyrics and 
music. 108 The Court therefore allowed the minimum taking for which 
the audience could recognise the original work. 109 
The majority of the Court of Appeal agreed the amount copied was 
excessive, so as to be beyond the conjure up test. The judges seemed 
influenced by the content of the defendant's work, that is the dirty 
lyricsY0 The conjure up test can therefore be used to deny fair use, as 
a means of censorship. 
The judgment of Mr Justice Mansfield (dissenting) is preferable. He 
considered that the defendant's work was a parody and the defendant 
had made a fair and limited use of the plaintiffs work in a reasonable 
manner. 111 He thought the District Court's conception of the conjure 
up test was too narrow and that although the defendant's use of dirty 
lyrics or language may be personally offensive to the judge, this is 
irrelevant in deciding whether the defendant's work is a fair use. 112 
Walt Disney v Air Pirates 113 was another case which applied the conjure 
up test. The plaintiff owned cartoon characters which were innocently 
delightful. The defendant copied the characters' graphic images and 
used them in an adult cartoon behaving in a way, quite unlike the 
108 425 F Supp 443,454. 
109 In Walt Disney v Mature Picture Corp 389 F Supp 1397 1he Court was also of !he 
view that the work was used for more lime than was necessary to conjure up the 
original. 
110 Above n 104. 
111 Above n 104, 188. 
112 Above n 104, 191. 
113 581 F 2d 751 (1978). 
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plaintiffs characters would behave. The defendant argued that the work 
was a parody and a fair use. 
The Court firstly upheld its previous decision in Loews and interpreted it 
as providing a threshold test which eliminated near verbatim copying. 114 
In the absence of near verbatim copying the conjure up test is applied. 
On the facts, it was held that the defendant had taken more than 
necessary. As the essence of the defendant's work was to parody the 
character's personalities rather than appearances, it was unnecessary to 
copy the images so closely. 
The defendant asserted that the humorous effect of a parody is best 
achieved when at first glance the defendant's work appears to be the 
original, but on closer examination it is something else. The Court 
rejected this. The parodist is not permitted to take as much of the 
plaintiffs work to make the best parody. The desire to make the best 
parody must be balanced against the rights of the copyright owner in his 
or her work. This balance is struck by allowing the parodist what is 
necessary to conjure up the original. 115 
In Atlanta Showcase if the defendant's work had been a parody it would 
have failed the conjure up test. It extensively copied from the plaintiffs 
work. The Court noted that it failed to parody even a significant portion 
of the elements of Gone With the Wind which it parallelled. 11 6 
In Elsmere Music the Court of Appeals (Second Circuit) favoured an 
expansion of the conjure up test and the recognition that a parody can be 
a fair use when the parodist takes more than allowed under the conjure 
up test.117 
114 Above n 113, 757. 
115 Above n 113, 758. 
116 Above n 92, 360. 
11 7 Above n 91. 
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"[T]he concept of "conjuring up" an original came into the 
copyright law not as a limitation on how much of an 
original may be used, but as a recognition that a parody 
frequently needs to be more than a fleeting evocation of 
an original in order to makes its humorous point. A 
parody is entitled at least to conjure up the original. Even 
more extensive use would still be fair use, provided the 
parody builds upon the original, using the original as a 
known element of modern culture and contributing 
something new for humorous effect or commentary." 
Subsequent cases have rejected extending the fair use defence to the 
wider test suggested in Elsmere Music. 
In Warner Bras v American Broadcasting Co 11 8 the Court of Appeals 
(Second Circuit) criticised the District Court's approval of the Elsmere 
Music test, fearing that under this test the defence could be used to 
shield an entire work substantially similar to the copyright work. 119 
The recent case of Fisher v Dees120 also disapproves of the suggestion 
that more extensive use beyond the conjure up test is fair use. The 
Court applied the conjure up test, but agreed with the Elsmere Music 
view that the test is not limited to the amount necessary to invoke initial 
recognition. 121 Instead the test is whether the parody could have been 
made by using less of the plaintiffs work. Relevant to deciding this is the 
degree of public recognition, the ease of conjuring up the original and 
the focus of the parody. In this case, in view of the parodist's medium, 
no more was taken than was necessary to accomplish its purpose. 
The United States courts therefore maintain the position that to be a fair 
use a parody must do no more than conjure up the original. This test 
118 523 F Supp 611 (1981); affirmed 654 F 2d 204 (1981); 350 F Supp 1187 (1982); 
affirmed 720 F 2d 231 (1983). 
119 654 F 2d 204,211. 
120 794 F 2d 432 ( 1986). 
121 Above n 120, 439. 
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poses the difficult question as to what quantum is necessary to conjure up 
the original. 
Courts therefore allow the minimum taking for which an audience can 
recognise the original work. This will prevent a parodist from drawing 
attention to a particular scene or a character's behaviour and making a 
comment about this particular aspect of a work. 
Decisions which suggest an application of Loews as a threshold test are 
even more restrictive. The Court in Loews was clearly treating parody 
like any other form of copying. The decision should have been rejected, 
rather than interpreted in a way which attempted to soften it's impact. 
This restrictive approach has the result of favouring mediocre over better 
parodies. The appeal of the best parodies lies in their close paralleling 
of the original work. This is clearly a drawback of the application of this 
test. It is in the interests of the public to promote the best, rather than 
the worst or mediocre parodies. A test which does not allow the public 
to appreciate the finest parodies defeats the purpose of allowing parody 
under the fair use defence. 
Fisher v Dees has expanded the conjure up test, to allow in appropriate 
cases, a high degree of similarity. 122 However the emphasis is still on 
allowing taking of the least amount necessary to conjure up the original. 
In the writer's opinion if the third factor must be applied, it would be 
better to apply the Elsmere Music test because this recognises the 
important aspect of fair use, that is, that the parodist must apply some 
original thought to create a new work. Some authors see Elsmere Music 
as going too far and as suggesting an open-ended standard whereby 
wholesale appropriation of another's work becomes possible under the 
122 Above n 2, § 13.05 [CJ. 
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banner of fair use.123 This was also the fear of the Court of Appeal in 
Warner Bros. The writer does not think this test goes too far. 
If the courts are to concentrate on the amount taken, then the more 
extensive taking allowed by Elsmere Music is preferable to the conjure up 
test. Generally, the basis of allowing the fair use defence is that the 
original work is used to produce a new work. The Elsmere Music test 
applies this rationale and the courts should use it, as it is consistent with 
the approach for other uses. 
Another disadvantage of the conjure up test is the potential for judicial 
censorship of works. As the conjure up test is so vague it allows judges 
to reject the fair use defence because of the content of the work. This 
may be explicit as in MCA v Wilson , or a silent factor underlying the 
decision.124 Judges should not be able to make decisions on the hidden 
basis that they were offended by the defendant's work. Copyright law 
should not operate as a silent means of censorship. 
The courts favour the conjure up test because of their wide definition of 
parody, that is, that the humorous element of parody is deserving of 
protection. They feel the need to limit the protection of parodies at 
some point. The better approach is to limit the parody definition to 
cover only critical works. 
Consideration should only be given to the amount ta ken to the extent 
that the defendant's work becomes a substitute for the copyright work. 
More importance should be placed on the effect on the demand for the 
plaintiffs work. 
123 Above n 2, § 13.05 [CJ. 
124 Above n 37, 30. It is suggested Wair Disney v A ir Pirates 581 F 2d 751 was also 
influenced by the judge's distas te for obsceni ty. 
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D. Effect on Demand Test 
Anglo-American law provides an economic justification for copyright 
protection. It is assumed that if authors are not given a copyright 
monopoly they would reap insufficient reward to encourage the 
production of creative works, which is in the public interest. The fair use 
defence means the public interest prevails over the copyright owner's 
right to control reproductions. The public interest is in the development 
of new works, not just substitutes, so it is these the defence aims to 
protect. 
Most United States courts when confronted with a parody have focused 
on the degree of similarity between the parody and copyright work. 
Many courts have disallowed extensive taking even when the copyright 
holder has not shown a likely threat to the economic value of his or her 
work. 125 
Often the plaintiffs in parody cases sought to protect their works not 
because of economic interests, but because of personal interests. They 
wished to prevent their works being parodied in a way they disliked. By 
concentrating on applying the conjure up test these types of interest may 
be protected. However, as present law stands the protection of personal 
interests cannot be justified. 
The courts should concentrate on the potential effect of the parody, on 
the work parodied. Economic harm must result from competition, not 
from the effectiveness of the parody's criticism. 126 
Nimmer calls this type of approach the functional test. The proper 
measure of the effect of the unauthorised use is whether the use 
supplants a valid use of the original. If the use fulfils an actual or 
potential function of the original, that effect is assumed to be a 
125 'The Parody Defence to Copyright Infringement : Productive Fair Use After 
Betamax' 97 llarv L Rev 1395,1400 (1985). 
126 Above n 33, 634. 
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disincentive to the author and therefore undesirable. However if the use 
merely supplements the functions of the original work it should be 
allowed. This test does not require evidence of actual economic harm 
suffered by the copyright owner, but an examination of the copyright 
work and the purpose and character of the second. 127 
Under this test the courts should not look towards the similarity of the 
medium, for example, both works are films, but rather the purpose of the 
works and whether they are directed to the same type of audience. This 
makes allowance for the fact that a novel has the potential of being 
developed into a film. 
A true parody will not usually be a threat to the economic value of 
copyright by competing with the copyright work. Therefore when parody 
victims allege infringement it is more likely that their pride rather than 
their copyright has been hurt. 128 
Some decisions have considered the effect on the demand test along with 
the conjure up test. This factor was laid down by the Court of Appeal in 
Berlin as appropriate to consider, as well as the conjure up test. 
In Elsmere Music the District Court decided that the defendant's use had 
not tended to interfere with the marketability of the copyright work. 129 
In MCA v Wilson the Court of Appeal noted that the defendant's use was 
not fair use because the songs were competitors in the entertainment 
fieldY0 The District Court in Warner Bros noted that the plaintiff had 
not proved that the defendant's work would reduce demand for the 
127 Above n 2, § 13.05 [BJ. 
128 Above n 36, 191 . 
129 Above n 103, 747. 
130 Above n 104, 183. 
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plaintiffs work. 131 The test was also applied in AtlanLa Showcase. The 
Court found Scarlett Fever was likely to harm the potential market for the 
derivative use of Gone With the Wind in the form of a theatrical 
adaption. It was irrelevant that a previous stage version of the copyright 
work was a failure. The Court applied the functional test and found the 
overall function of both works was to entertain. As the defendant's work 
was not a parody, its function was not criticism. 132 Arguably a parody's 
function is also entertainment but as it is aimed at a different type of 
audience, it is not a substitute for the original. 
The decision which best expresses the approach is Fisher v Dees. It will 
not be a fair use where the defendant's work supplants the original in the 
market which the original is aimed at or in which the original is or has 
reasonable potential to become commercially valuable. The parody's 
critical impact must be excluded from this test, as copyright law is not 
designed to stifle critics. A destructive parody has an important role lo 
play in social and literary criticism. 133 In this case, the defendant's work 
did not fulfil the demand for the original, as people wishing to hear the 
plaintiffs work, a romantic ballad, would not be satisfied with hearing the 
parody. 
The courts should concentrate on applying this factor. As copyright law 
emphasises the protection of economic interests, the fair use defence 
should only be rejected where the defendant's work becomes a substitute 
for the original, and is in competition with it. The defendant is entitled 
to profit from a parody, which would have a different market, but is not 
entitled to compete with the plaintiffs work. As a true parody involves a 
critique through humour and original thought by the parodist, it would 
never effect the demand for the original. 
131 523FSupp611 ,617. 
132 Above n 92, 360-361. 
133 Above n 120, 438. 
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E. Advertisements 
There are no cases where the courts have accepted the parody defence 
when the defendant's work was an advertisement. 
In DC Comics v Crazy Eddie the defendant's television commercial for 
electronic equipment involved detailed copying of the plaintiffs televised 
trailers for a Superman film. The defendant argued the advertisement 
was a parody. This was not a case of fair use, but one of unjust 
appropriation of copyrighted material for personal profit. 134 
The judge emphasised that the advertisement was only made for a 
commercial motive so this weighed against fair use. There was also 
detailed copying, so the defendant's work would probably not have 
fulfilled the third factor requirement. 
The case was discussed in Warner Bros. The Court felt there was a valid 
distinction between a commercial purpose to sell the defendant's 
products, which the plaintiff could prevent, and a parody for 
entertainment in the hopes of commercial succcss. 135 
Later cases have emphasised that an advertisement will not be a parody 
because of the lack of intention of making a humorous comment. 
In Original Appalachian Artwork Inc v Topps Chewing Gum lnc 136 the 
manufacturer of Cabbage Patch Kids alleged copyright had been 
infringed by the defendant's Garbage Pail Kids stickers. The stickers 
depicted dolls with features similar to Cabbage Patch Kids in rude, 
violent situations. The Court found the stickers copied a substantial 
amount of the Cabbage Patch Kids' features. The defendant argued the 
work was a parody and protected under the fair use defence. 
134 205 USPQ 1177,1178 (1979). 
135 720 F 2d 231,242. 
136 642FSupp 1031 (1986). 
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The Court stated "the primary purpose behind the defendant's parody is 
not an effort to make social comment but an attempt to make 
money". 137 The basic concept behind the defendant's stickers aimed at 
capitalising on the Cabbage Patch craze. The defendant's use was an 
infringement. 
In Tin Pan Apple v Miller Brewing Co Inc 138 the plaintiff rap group 
brought an infringement action against a beer manufacturer who used 
look-alikes and part of the plaintiffs songs in a beer commercial. The 
defendant argued the commercial was an obvious parody and fair use. 
The Court found there was ample authority for the proposition that 
appropriation solely for personal profit, unrelieved by any creative 
purpose, cannot be considered a parody as a matter of law.139 The 
Court found the advertisement was not a parody relying on the Elsmere 
Music definition. 
The writer considers that this approach has difficulties. Advertisers 
arguably do put some creative effort into the work, although commercial 
profit is more important. Parodists in the entertainment field may also 
have the commercial return as uppermost in their minds when creating a 
work. 
Instead the courts should rely on the suggested definition of parody, that 
it must involve critical comment on a work or society. An advertiser is 
not usually concerned with making a valuable critical comment, but 
rather with associating his or her product with a well-known and popular 
work, often by making some humorous adaption to the original. 
137 Above n 136, 1034. 
138 737 F Supp 826 (1990). 
139 Above n 138, 831. 
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Some advertisements could be considered parodies, for example those 
which are advocating a cause. For example Greenpeace advertisements 
which criticise human treatment of the world, for example, pollution, 
involve criticism of an aspect of society. 
Usually when applying the more limited definition of parody an 
advertisement would not be a parody. There would be no need to 
emphasise the commercial purpose of advertisements. 
IX CONCLUSION: THE NEW ZEALAND APPROACH 
New Zealand copyright law is faced with the choice between two 
different ways of treating parodies. 
English, Canadian and Australian copyright law adopt a restrictive 
approach to the art of parody. Parody is treated the same as any other 
form of copying. A parody will infringe copyright if it takes a substantial 
part of the original work. 
As an art form, parody depends on the copying of other works. The 
success of a parody depends on the audience recognising the work being 
parodied. Although some parodies will not copy a substantial part of the 
original work, so as to be a copyright infringement, most will face a 
possible copyright action. The best parodies arc those which closely 
parallel the original work and therefore keep the details of the work 
being ridiculed in the minds of the audience at all times. 
By giving the opportunity for copyright owners to bring an action against 
parodists, copyright law could destroy the art of parody. This will mean a 
loss to the world of literature and art, and be contrary to the rationale of 
copyright law which is to promote artistic creativity. 
The New Zealand Copyright Act 1962, is similar to those of Australia 
and Canada, all of them being based on the English legislation. 
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In the Common Law, the English courts treated certain purposes, 
according to the circumstances as a fair dealing, and therefore not an 
infringement. Parody was not one of these. When fair dealing as a 
defence to an infringement action was codified by copyright legislation, 
parody was therefore not included in the list of the only purposes for 
which the defence could apply. This prevented the development of the 
Jaw to include parody as a fair dealing purpose, for the legislation is now 
relied on by courts in these jurisdictions, as establishing that parody is to 
be judged according to the infringement test. 140 
As the New Zealand Copyright Act is similar to the English legislation, it 
is submitted that the New Zealand courts would follow the strict English, 
Australian and Canadian approach. The writer considers that the United 
States approach of treating parody as a fair use, depending on the facts, 
is to be preferred. Parody should be treated as a valued and respected 
independent art form in copyright Jaw. The fact that by definition it is 
premised on copying, should not detract from this. 
The United States originally had the same restrictive approach as the 
other jurisdictions discussed but this was changed in Berlin v EC 
Publications Jnc. 141 This is reflected in the United States Copyright Act 
1976. The codification of the fair use defence has not involved a specific 
list of purposes for which a use is fair. Instead the purposes listed are 
just some of the examples of purposes which may have the fair use 
defence. The legislature anticipated that parody would continue to be 
treated as a fair use in the appropriate circumstances. 
Although the United States approach of treating parody as a fair use 
should be followed, their definition of parody and the factors considered 
should be treated with caution. 
140 See n 62, n 66 and n 78 and accompanying text. 
141 Above n 89. 
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The critical element of parody is that which copyright law should aim to 
protect. The wide definition of parody adopted in the United States 
where the humorous element is found deserving of protection should not 
be followed. There is little social merit in protecting a merely humorous 
adaption of a copyright work from an infringement action. It may be 
entertaining, but other purposes protected by the fair use defence are 
those which involve expanding knowledge. 
The United States approach of emphasising the amount taken, using the 
conjure up test as determinative of fair use should not be adopted. This 
is a restrictive test. It means that the better parodies, which involve close 
paralleling of the original will not be considered a fair use. This is 
contrary to the public interest. The promotion of creative works should 
involve, the promotion of the better as well as the mediocre works. 
The type of test relying on the amount taken, should not be so heavily 
relied on to determine whether a parody is a fair use. As for other 
purposes, the amount taken should only be relevant to determine 
whether the parody is a substitute for the original. 
More importance should be placed on the effect of the parody on the 
demand for the original work. Where the parody is in corn petition with 
the original work, that is, it can be purchased as a substitute, it will not 
be a fair use. As a parody involves a critique of the original work or 
some aspect of society, it cannot act as a substitute for the copyright 
work. This test means that only the economic interests of copyright 
holders, those protected by Anglo-American and New Zealand copyright 
law are considered by the courts. 
As the writer considers a parody definition should emphasise the critical 
effect it is possible for parody to be considered a fair use under the 
existing New Zealand legislation, as a form of criticism. This was 
suggested as possible, though not on the facts of the case before the 
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Court in the English case of Williamson Music Ltd v The Pearson 
Partnership Ltd. 142 
It would be unwise to rely on this dicta to have such an influence over 
the New Zealand courts, in the face of the strong view in other parody 
cases, that it is correct to apply the substantial similarity test to parody. 
In order to escape this conservative English, Canadian and Australian 
influence, the Copyright Act 1962 should be amended to specifically 
include parody as a purpose for which the fair dealing defence can apply. 
This amendment should also include a statutory definition of parody, 
limiting it to cover only those works which have a critical element. This 
would eliminate the possibility of the problems caused by the wider 
United States definition. The New Zealand courts will not face a 
situation of having to develop other restrictive tests, to prevent a 
defendant succeeding on the parody defence argument, where his or her 
work is just a humorous adaption. Such an amendment will mean New 
Zealand copyright law will help rather than hinder the art form of 
parody. 
142 Above, n 61. 
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